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We investigate whether powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) influence the conditions of 
their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, we examine (i) the association between CEO power 
and the proportion of ex ante cash bonus to base salary (bonus ratio), (ii) the association 
between CEO power and the relative use of non-financial to financial targets in cash bonus 
contracts, and (iii) the performance consequences of incorporating non-financial targets in cash 
bonus contracts. Results show that powerful CEOs are associated with greater ex ante bonus 
ratios and higher proportions of non-financial performance targets compared to less powerful 
CEOs. Furthermore, the use of quantitative and CSR-related non-financial performance targets 
is positively associated with subsequent firm performance, and the use of undefined non-
financial performance targets is associated with negative subsequent firm performance. These 
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There are two alternative theoretical explanations for CEO incentive compensation; efficient 
contracting theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and managerial power theory (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003; 2005). While much of the earlier empirical evidence is consistent with efficient 
contracting theory (Conyon et al., 2011; Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013; Shan and 
Walter, 2016), there is an emerging body of literature that supports managerial power theory. 
This literature suggests that CEO attributes and power influence many aspects of corporate 
decision-making, including compensation arrangements (Abernethy, Kuang, & Qin, 2015; 
Morse, Nabda, & Seru, 2011; Song & Wan 2019). To date, empirical studies have mainly 
focused on CEOs’ equity-based pay (e.g., restricted stock grants and stock options). However, 
the influence of powerful CEOs on their cash bonus conditions remains unexplored, despite 
cash bonuses representing an ongoing and substantial part of CEOs’ compensation package 
(Frydman & Jenter, 2010; Conyon et al., 2011; Murphy, 2013; Shan & Walter, 2016).1  
Accordingly, we examine whether powerful CEOs influence the conditions of their 
cash bonus contracts and how these contracts impact on subsequent firm performance. 
Specifically, the objectives of this study are to provide empirical evidence on (i) the association 
between CEO power and the proportion of ex ante cash bonus to base salary (hereafter referred 
to as bonus ratio); (ii) the association between CEO power and the proportion of non-financial 
targets (such as product quality, strategic planning and leadership skills) to financial targets 
(such as firm sales and profits) in cash bonus contracts, and (iii) the performance implications 
of incorporating non-financial performance targets into CEOs’ cash bonus contracts. 
Consistent with prior studies, CEO power is defined as the ability of the CEO to significantly 
influence firm directors and corporate decision-making, thereby revoking the effectiveness of 
corporate governance mechanisms (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; 2005). 
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 The motivation for this study is twofold. First, executive compensation has received 
renewed scrutiny following the global financial crisis and the introduction of say-on-pay 
legislation (Alissa, 2015; Collins, Marquardt & Niu, 2019; Clarkson, Walker, & Nicholls, 
2011; Correa & Lel, 2016; Grosse, Kean, & Scott, 2017; Iliev & Vitanova, 2019). In response, 
many companies attempt to justify large compensation packages by offering performance-
based pay in the form of equity grants and options. However, the performance targets used in 
these contracts may offer an avenue for firms to camouflage higher pay (e.g., Abernethy et al., 
2015). While the literature is informative about the strategic use of stock and option grants, we 
argue that cash bonuses may be used as another means to camouflage high levels of executive 
pay. This is particularly relevant within the Australian setting where equity-based 
compensation is still emerging and cash bonuses are not subject to tax deduction limits.2 
Specifically, cash bonuses can be as much as five times the CEO’s base salary. Moreover, the 
comprehensive disclosure of compensation-related performance targets in firms’ annual 
reports in Australia (Clarkson, Van Bueren, & Walker, 2006), allows us to perform a detailed 
examination of the types of performance measures used in cash bonus contracts and their 
association with subsequent firm performance.  
 Second, while concerns have been raised about the use of non-financial measures in 
compensation contracts, empirical evidence is limited. In particular, practitioners and 
regulators have expressed growing discontent about the use of non-financial measures due to 
the prevalence of high bonus payments (Bennett, Bettis, Gopalan, & Milbourn, 2017; Rose, 
2017; Yeates, 2017). Specifically, the perceived fairness of CEOs’ cash bonus contracts plays 
a major role surrounding the outrage about executive compensation (Arnold & Grasser, 2018). 
Concerns are that non-financial measures may be easier to manipulate, hence reward CEOs for 
activities which should be considered part of their job description (Knight, 2016; Robertson, 
2016). Knight (2016) reports in the financial press that: 
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[…] some shareholders rallied against what they considered the easiness of meeting these 
[non-financial] hurdles which they believe is due to the fact they are not sufficiently focused 
on hard quantitative financial measures like total shareholder returns or returns on investment 
or even just statutory profit. 
Furthermore, the fact that equity-based incentives have begun to incorporate non-financial 
performance targets highlights the importance of evaluating shareholders’ concerns regarding 
the legitimacy of these measures (Ryan, 2017). As a result, we shed light on whether 
practitioners’ concerns about the use of non-financial measures are justified by the type of non-
financial measured used (i.e., qualitative, undefined, quantitative and CSR focused) and their 
impact on subsequent firm performance. 
The empirical evidence provided in this study is based on a sample of 1,085 firm year 
observations from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Top 500 listed firms for the period 
2004 to 2016. The bonus ratio and the proportion of non-financial to financial targets are 
calculated based on hand-collected data. Following prior literature, which suggests that a single 
measure of CEO power fails to capture the overall level of CEO influence within the firm 
(Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Finkelstein, 1992), we construct a CEO power index 
consisting of eight measures. Our measure of CEO power contains characteristics which 
capture historical and new measures of power, including CEO tenure, shareholdings, board 
size, board independence, subcommittee membership, and co-option of directors on the 
remuneration committee (Abernethy et al., 2015; Core et al., 1999; Finkelstein, 1992; Lisic, 
Neal, Zhang, & Zhang, 2016).3  
Our findings support the contention that powerful CEOs influence the conditions of 
their cash bonus contracts. Specifically, CEO power is positively associated with the bonus 
ratio. This suggests that powerful CEOs justify their compensation by linking a greater 
proportion of their pay to performance-based bonus compensation as opposed to base salary. 
Moreover, we find a positive association between CEO power and the relative weight placed 
on non-financial performance targets, suggesting that non-financial measures may be used to 
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compensate powerful CEOs for facets of their managerial effort. However, this finding may 
also signify that powerful CEOs incorporate non-financial measures to increase CEO 
compensation above what is justified by economic performance of the firm (Ittner, Larcker, & 
Rajan, 1997).  
To shed light on these alternative interpretations of our findings, we examine whether 
the use of non-financial targets in bonus contracts is associated with subsequent firm 
performance. If non-financial measures are used to encourage powerful CEOs to act in a 
manner that is consistent with shareholders’ interests, we expect a positive association between 
the use of non-financial targets and subsequent firm performance. Alternatively, if non-
financial measures are used by powerful CEOs to increase their compensation beyond a level 
justified by the firm’s economic performance, we expect a negative association between the 
use of non-financial targets and subsequent firm performance. This is possible as non-financial 
targets are more prone to manipulation and are rarely subject to external verification (e.g., Ittner 
et al., 1997). We find that the use of non-financial measures which are quantitative, and 
consequently verifiable, is positively associated with industry-adjusted return on assets, as are 
performance targets linked to corporate social responsibility (CSR). These findings support the 
view that the use of objective performance targets (Ittner et al., 1997) and CSR performance 
targets (e.g., Cook, Romi, Sánchez & Sánchez, 2019; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Lev, 
Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan, 2010) has positive firm performance implications. Interestingly, 
the use of performance targets that are not defined in annual reports (i.e., when a firm mentions 
using non-financial performance targets but does not provide any information as to what these 
targets are) is negatively related to subsequent firm performance. This is noteworthy as 44.54% 
of firms in our sample include targets that are not defined. These findings support the view that 
performance targets subject to a greater degree of discretion are a means of camouflaging 
executive compensation levels as such targets do not provide sufficient incentives to increase 
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subsequent firm performance. To address endogeneity concerns, we perform a two-stage least 
squares and use a propensity score matched subsample. Although our empirical findings remain 
consistent, we cannot completely rule out that endogeneity is driving our results, which is a 
limitation of this study. 
The findings of this study make important contributions to the literature and has 
implications for regulators. First, our findings add to the debate concerning whether efficient 
contracting theory or managerial power theory explains CEO compensation levels and structure 
(Abernethy et al., 2015; Balsam, Gifford & Puthenpurackal, 2017; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 
2005; Lisic et al., 2016; Morse, Nanda, & Seru, 2011; Murphy, 2013; Song & Wan 2019). The 
prevalence of CEO cash bonuses at consistently high levels, and the common use of non-
financial targets in determining cash bonuses, further highlight the importance of examining 
how performance conditions are designed and applied in CEOs’ bonus contracts (Maley, 2018; 
Yeates, 2017). Our findings suggest that powerful CEOs receive large cash bonuses relative to 
their salary and that these cash bonuses are often based on non-financial targets. Interestingly, 
firms that do not disclose any information on the type of non-financial targets used in cash 
bonus contracts experience lower subsequent performance than firms that explicitly define their 
non-financial targets. These findings are of particular interest to practitioners and regulators 
who have expressed concerns that bonus compensation contracts are designed in a way that 
maximises CEO compensation and do not always lead to better firm performance. 
Second, we contribute to the literature that examines the costs and benefits of subjective 
targets in executive compensation contracts (e.g., Bushman, Indjejikian, & Smith, 1996; Gibbs, 
Merchant, Van der Stede, & Vargus, 2004; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; 
2001; 2009; O’Connor, Deng, & Fei, 2015; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). While subjective 
performance measures are less verifiable (i.e., they are not audited), the literature has argued 
that such measures can be informative about various aspects of managerial actions not captured 
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by objective performance measures (Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; 2001; 
2009). Additionally, subjective performance measures are used when there is noise in objective 
performance measures (Gibbs et al., 2004; Höppe & Moers, 2011). Empirical evidence on 
whether the use of subjective targets in executive compensation is associated with firm 
performance is, however, rare. For example, using proprietary data on department managers’ 
compensation contracts, Gibbs et al. (2004) do not find subjective bonuses to be associated 
with department productivity and profitability. We address this gap in the literature by 
documenting that the use of subjective (qualitative) non-financial measures is not associated 
with subsequent firm performance while objective (quantifiable) non-financial measures are 
positively associated with subsequent firm performance. We are able to do so by exploiting the 
Australian setting which provides a rich source of information about CEO bonus contracts (see 
Appendix A).  
Third, our study contributes to the literature on CSR reporting and firm performance 
(e.g. Cook et al., 2019; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Lev et al., 2010). Prior studies 
argue that CSR reporting provides information about firm performance beyond the information 
contained in accounting numbers such as earnings. For instance, customer satisfaction and 
spill-over effects of word of mouth advertising have been shown to be positively associated 
with firm performance (Gruca & Rego, 2005; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; O’Connell & Sullivan, 
2011; Tuli & Bharadwaj, 2009). Additionally, socially responsible firms appeal to certain 
customers and have been found to be associated with superior sales and firm performance (Lev 
et al., 2010). Socially responsible firms can also attract and retain high quality employees, 
which contributes to firm value (Edmans, 2011; Mao & Weathers, 2019). Furthermore, 
commitment to social and environmental activities can decrease lawsuits and environmental 
costs (Dhaliwal et al., 2011) and increase investment efficiency and innovation (Cook et al., 
2019). Overall, while prior literature is informative in documenting an association between 
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CSR and firm performance, little is known about the role CSR measures play in compensation 
contracts (O’Connell & Sullivan, 2011). Some studies examine the association between types 
of CEO compensation and CSR performance (e.g., Cai, Jo, & Pan, 2012; Mahoney & Thorne 
2005; 2006), while others examine predictors of the use of CSR measures in compensation 
contracts (e.g., Hong, Li, & Minor, 2016). They do not, however, link CSR performance 
measures in compensation contracts to subsequent firm financial performance. We address this 
gap in the literature by documenting that aligning CEO incentives to CSR performance (based 
on customer satisfaction, staff safety and satisfaction, internal governance standards and 
sustainability) has positive firm performance. Specifically, our study highlights that linking 
performance-based incentive pay to CSR performance is positively associated with subsequent 
industry-adjusted ROA.  
 The remainder of this study is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 presents the research design. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection process and Section 5 reports the empirical results. 
Section 6 presents additional analyses and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Relevant literature and hypotheses development 
2.1 Relevant literature 
Numerous authors have provided an overview of the agency and managerial power 
explanations of CEO compensation and the accompanying empirical evidence (e.g., Frydman 
& Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013; Shan & Walter, 2016).  Overall, they document that firms, on 
average, efficiently address the agency problem between managers and shareholders. 4 
Nonetheless, some inconsistencies remain. Specifically, recent evidence suggests that powerful 
CEOs are able to influence their compensation arrangements (Abernethy et al., 2015; Morse et 
al., 2011). For example, using U.S. data for the period 1992 to 2003, Morse et al. (2011) find 
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that powerful CEOs are able to extract rents and increase their total compensation by 
opportunistically altering the focus of their incentive pay towards better performing measures. 
Similarly, Abernethy et al. (2015) examine the association between equity-based incentives 
and CEO power for the period 1997 to 2004. They show that powerful CEOs are able to 
influence the adoption and choice of performance targets implemented in performance-vested 
stock option plans, particularly in an attempt to appease public outrage. Similar results have 
been found with regard to CEO bonuses within the UK setting (Cho, Ibrahim and Yan 2019). 
Overall, these studies suggest that both the mix of performance targets as well as individual 
targets are influenced by powerful CEOs. 
More recently, it has been argued that discrepancies exist between the empirical 
evidence on cash bonuses and practices in the industry (Guay, Kepler, & Tsui, 2019). The 
literature on CEO incentive contracts concludes that incentives from cash bonuses are modest 
compared to equity-based compensation. However, the vast majority of U.S. executive 
compensation plans incorporate cash bonus payouts, which may offer CEOs liquidity (Guay et 
al., 2019). Furthermore, the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO cash compensation is 
much greater than estimated in prior studies (Guay et al., 2019). We extend the existing 
literature by focusing on cash bonuses, which is particularly relevant today given that a recent 
CEO pay survey and corresponding media coverage have raised questions about whether such 
bonuses adequately reflect firm performance (e.g., Rose, 2017; Yeates, 2017). 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
The ASX Corporate Governance Council (2014, p. 33) recommends firms remunerate 
fairly and responsibly through ‘an appropriate balance of fixed remuneration and performance-
based remuneration’. This approach aims to align the interests of CEOs to that of shareholders 
as excessive base salaries can negatively impact subsequent firm performance by increasing 
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CEOs’ risk aversion (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990). Specifically, CEOs who only receive base 
salaries have incentives to accept (reject) projects that reduce (increase) the volatility of the 
firm’s cash flow, regardless of their net present value (Guay, 1999; Smith & Watts, 1982). 
Therefore, instead of being remunerated with large salaries which may encourage investor 
outrage, CEOs may camouflage high compensation levels in the form of incentive 
compensation (such as cash bonuses) which are justified by meeting set performance targets. 
Given the above, we argue that powerful CEOs negotiate a greater cash bonus relative 
to base salary to camouflage higher compensation levels; base salaries are generally fixed over 
time and no guidelines exist on what should be considered an appropriate bonus ratio. 
Furthermore, cash bonuses are less likely to come under public scrutiny because, unlike base 
salaries, they are justified by various measures of performance. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between bonus ratio and CEO power. 
 
In addition to recommending that executive remuneration incorporates a balance of 
fixed and incentive compensation, the ASX Corporate Governance Council (2014, p. 33) 
suggests that ‘performance-based compensation is linked to clearly specified performance 
targets […] aligned to the entity’s short and long-term performance objectives’ in order to 
appropriately reflect the various responsibilities of executives. Nonetheless, whether these 
performance targets are associated with financial or non-financial targets is within the firms’ 
discretion. 
Non-financial performance targets, such as having a focus on innovation, are a crucial 
part of effective incentive compensation arrangements (Guay et al., 2019). However, as non-
financial performance targets are specific to the individual firm, these measures may be more 
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subjective than performance associated with quantitative financial targets. Furthermore, non-
financial targets change more frequently and do not always display the same stable year-on-
year patterns as financial targets (Ittner et al., 1997). These characteristics raise the concern of 
investors and market analysts as they make manipulation possible, while at the same time 
making sanctions from outside auditors difficult, particularly as non-financial targets cannot 
easily be compared to industry benchmarks (Ittner et al., 1997; Robertson, 2016). 
Consequently, powerful CEOs may be able to apply their influence to negotiate a greater 
proportion of non-financial performance targets to be included in their cash bonus contract in 
order to achieve the greatest payoff possible. We predict that, in order to minimise 
compensation risk, powerful CEOs influence target choices and set easier targets ex ante or 
targets that can be manipulated ex post (i.e., non-financial performance targets) (Abernethy et 
al., 2015; Morse et al., 2011). This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: There is a positive association between CEO power and the proportion of non-
financial targets used in cash bonus contracts. 
 
Thus far, this study has focused on the notion that powerful CEOs are able to obtain 
their preferred bonus conditions by exercising influence over corporate governance 
mechanisms. However, whether CEOs’ preferred bonus conditions have any implications for 
firm performance is yet to be determined. Efficient contracting theory suggests that executive 
compensation contracts reflect a firm’s economic characteristics and provide managers with 
incentives to maximise shareholder value (Core et al., 1999; Holmstrom, 1979; Matolcsy & 
Wright, 2011). If firms contract efficiently, we expect a positive association between incentive 
compensation and subsequent firm performance (O’Connell & Sullivan, 2014). Alternatively, 
managerial power theory suggests that incentive contracts are a manifestation of CEO power 
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and enable rent extraction resulting in negative subsequent firm performance (Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2003, 2005; Bugeja, Matolcsy, & Spiropoulos, 2017). Early studies fail to explore in 
detail how such compensation contracts result in negative firm performance. However, recent 
studies find that targets which are more easily achieved negatively impact subsequent firm 
performance (Abernethy et al., 2015; Morse et al., 2011;). Unlike financial targets, non-
financial targets are less objective and easier to manipulate ex post.5 This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3a: There is a negative association between the proportion of non-financial targets 
used in cash bonus contracts and subsequent firm performance. 
 
Prior studies provide various theories as to why firms use non-financial targets in 
compensation contracts. In particular, non-financial targets are used to capture multiple 
dimensions of a CEO’s actions and when financial measures are noisy (Bushman et al., 1996; 
Gibbs et al., 2004; Höppe & Moers, 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; 2001; 2009; O’Connor et 
al., 2015; Rajan & Reichelstein, 2009). To further understand the types of non-financial 
measures used in bonus contracts and whether they impact subsequent firm performance, we 
decompose non-financial targets into those that are: quantifiable, qualitative, undefined, and 
those that measure aspects of CSR. We predict that non-financial targets that are qualitative in 
nature or undefined are used as a camouflage, hence are negatively associated with firm 
performance (Abernethy et al., 2015). These types of non-financial targets are problematic 
because they are subject to issues such as reneging, favouritism and bias (Höppe & Moers, 
2011). Moreover, they are easier for powerful CEOs to defend. In contrast, non-financial 
targets that are quantifiable and less manipulable by powerful CEOs are expected to be 
positively associated with subsequent performance.  
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Finally, prior studies document that focusing on the wellbeing of customers, employees 
and the environment has a positive impact on firm performance (e.g., Cook et al., 2019; 
Edmans, 2011; Ittner & Lacker, 1998; Lev et al., 2010). Specifically, we predict that 
incorporating non-financial targets centred around CSR in CEOs’ bonus contracts encourages 
CEOs to focus on these important issues, ultimately positively impacting future firm 
performance. This leads to the following hypotheses on the specific types of non-financial 
targets used in CEOs’ cash bonus contracts: 
 
H3b: There is a negative association between non-financial targets that are qualitative 
or undefined and subsequent firm performance. 
 
H3c: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-financial targets 
that are quantitative and subsequent firm performance. 
 
H3d: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-financial targets 
which focus on CSR and subsequent firm performance. 
 
3. Research design and variable measurement 
The following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is estimated to test hypotheses 
H1 and H2.6 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2−12 ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1  
 
 





The alternate dependent variables applied in Model (1) are Bonus Ratio and Non_Fin. Ratio. 
Bonus Ratio is the maximum ex ante cash bonus available to the CEO as a proportion of their 
base salary as stated in the firm’s remuneration report. Non_Fin. Ratio is the proportion of cash 
bonus weighted towards non-financial performance targets. CEO Power Index and firm control 
variables are described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 and defined in Table 1. 
Model (2) tests the association between subsequent firm performance and the use of 
non-financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts (H3). The dependent variable is an 
industry-adjusted return on assets (ROAt+1), calculated by subtracting the industry mean ROA 
for firm i in year t+1.  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1  =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽2−5∑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1  
                                                 + 𝛽5−18𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽19−28𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖 
 
To test H3b through H3d, the independent variable Non_Fin. Ratio is replaced with a 
variable that captures qualitative, undefined, quantitative, and CSR non-financial performance 
measures, respectively. Furthermore, because the use of equity-based compensation is still 
emerging within the Australian setting, we estimate both models first on the full sample and 
then on subsamples of cash-only and equity-based compensation firms. 
3.1 Key independent variables 
3.1.1 CEO power index 
Consistent with Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2005), managerial power is defined as the ability of 
the CEO to influence firm directors and corporate decision-making. Following this notion, a 
number of researchers have examined CEO power in various corporate decisions. 7 
Comprehensively, these authors recognise that any single measure of power may not be able 




summary index based on eight CEO characteristics capturing three dimensions of CEO power 
identified by Finkelstein (1992).8   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Following prior literature, we create a unidimensional measure of CEO power (Lisic et 
al., 2016). First, we measure the number of years the CEO has been employed as CEO of the 
firm because their ability to influence board decisions is likely to increase with tenure 
(Abernethy et al., 2015; Bebchuk and Fried 2003;2005; Core et al., 1999; van Essen, Otten, & 
Carberry, 2015). Second, we assess the CEOs’ shareholdings relative to total outstanding 
shares. CEOs with greater shareholding are likely to be more powerful as they have greater 
voting power, increased ownership control, and consequently are more likely to be 
entrenchmed in the board (Core et al., 1999). Third, we consider board size since the board’s 
efficiency in constraining CEO power and generating cohesive decisions is lower when the 
number of directors is large (Abernethy et al., 2015; Matolcsy, Tyler, & Wells, 2011). Fourth, 
we account for the relative proportion of independent directors on the board as they are less 
likely to be vulnerable to conflicts of interest with corporate insiders and consequently diminish 
CEO power (Abernethy et al., 2015; Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 2005). Fifth, we assess the extent 
to which the CEO is involved and can influence various corporate decisions by considering the 
number of board subcommittees on which the CEO sits. Board subcommittees create a 
concentration of decision-making rights and increase the ability of CEOs to influence these 
committees during the decision-making process (Abernethy et al., 2015; Core et al., 1999;). 
Specifically, we consider how many committees the CEO sits on, as well as whether the CEO 
is a member of the nomination and/or remuneration committee. The nomination committee is 
intended to make independent decisions regarding the composition of the board of directors 
(ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2014). Similarly, CEOs who are on the remuneration 
committee should not be involved in deciding their own remuneration arrangements. Despite 
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such recommendations, Conyon and Peck (1998) find that CEOs who are on the remuneration 
committee obtain higher compensation packages than CEOs who are not. Last, powerful CEOs 
may impair the function of the remuneration committee by appointing directors who are 
independent but beholden to their agenda (i.e., they are co-opted). Co-option is a commonly 
cited concern in the corporate governance literature and evidence suggests that independent 
directors who are co-opted by the CEO are associated with weaker monitoring efficiency 
(Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2014). Similarly, co-opted directors have been found to be 
associated with higher total CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999). Therefore, we predict that 
co-opted remuneration committees enable CEOs to influence the conditions of their 
compensation contracts.9 
Comprehensively, the CEO power score ranges from 0 to 8. In order to account for the 
fact that some firms do not have a nomination committee and/or remuneration committee, the 
CEO power score is subsequently divided by the maximum power available to a CEO. This 
creates the CEO Power Index applied in Model (1). 
3.1.2 Non-financial targets 
Recently, there has been an increased emphasis on the use of non-financial performance targets 
such as customer satisfaction, innovation and market share in cash bonus contracts (Yeates, 
2017). The increasing use of non-financial performance targets has raised concerns among 
analysts and shareholders that such targets can be manipulated easily and reward CEOs for 
activities that should be a normal part of their job description (Knight, 2016; Robertson, 2016). 
In order to examine the consequences of negotiated cash bonus contracts on subsequent firm 
performance, we capture the relative weights placed on financial and non-financial 
performance targets in CEOs’ cash bonus contracts. An underlying assumption when applying 
these measures is that bonus contracts and their conditions are established at the beginning of 
the financial year (Shaw & Zhang, 2010).10 
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To test H3a–H3d we decompose non-financial targets into those that are: qualitative 
(Qualitative), undefined (Undefined), quantitative (Quantitative), and include measures of 
CSR (CSR). These decomposed measures are used alternatively in model (2) in order to 
examine how each of these types of non-financial targets impacts subsequent firm performance. 
Appendix A outlines all the categories of non-financial targets identified during the data 
collection process. These are used to construct the variables Qualitative, Undefined, 
Quantitative, and CSR as detailed in Table 1. 
3.2 Control variables 
Based on prior literature, we include as controls economic characteristics that are expected to 
determine a firm’s relative demand for a particular type of compensation contract (e.g., Core 
et al., 1999; Matolcsy & Wright, 2011). These include: return-on-assets (ROA t-1); the natural 
log of total assets (lnSizet-1) as a proxy for firm size; the standard deviation of return on assets 
(stdROA t-1)to proxy for risk; the natural log of operating cash flow scaled by total assets 
(lnCasht-1); annual stock return (Return t-1); the debt to equity ratio (Leverage t-1) to capture 
external monitoring by large debtholders; growth measured as the market-to-book ratio (M/B t-
1); and year and industry fixed effects.
11 
We include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm employs a compensation 
consultant during the year (Consultant); the literature suggests that compensation consultants 
have economic incentives to bias their recommendations upwards to please management 
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; 2005; Grosse et al., 2019; Murphy & Sandino, 2019). Specifically, 
increases in compensation, equity and cash bonuses in particular, are associated with firms that 
employ a compensation consultant. (Grosse et al., 2019). Last, we control for any change in 
base salary (ΔSalary) to capture the impact on the bonus ratio should base salary change 
significantly compared to the prior year. 
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4. Sample and data 
4.1 Sample selection 
Data on CEO compensation and board characteristics are obtained from the Connect 4 database 
and firm characteristics data are obtained from the DatAnalysis database for the period from 
2004 to 2016. Information on the use of remuneration consultants is hand collected. Similarly, 
data to construct the Bonus Ratio and Non_Fin. Ratio, as well as the decomposed measures, 
are hand collected from the remuneration reports provided in firms’ annual reports. 
The sample used in this study comprises the ASX Top 500 firms for the period 2004 to 
2016. We focus on ASX Top 500 firms as these firms are more likely to disclose incentive 
targets used in CEO cash bonus contracts. We remove firm-year observations in which specific 
details about the cash bonus contract are not disclosed (1,436), those which do not have a bonus 
scheme in place (154), firms in which the CEO receives payment from another firm (5), firms 
with co-CEOs (26), and firms in which there is a CEO change during the year (54). We also 
removed firms lacking data required for the empirical models (398). The final sample results 
in 1,085 firm-year observations to test H1 and 687 firm-year observations to test H2 and H3a–
d.12 A breakdown of the sample selection is provided in Panel A of Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Panel B of Table 2 reports the annual distribution of firms by financial year. Although 
the frequencies of observations increase towards the later sample years, the sample is not 
dominated by any one year. The increase in frequencies over time may be caused by an 
improvement in reporting practices following the introduction of new reporting requirements 
in 2003 (Clarkson et al., 2011). The lowest frequency of observations occurs in 2004 (1.84 
percent) whereas the highest occurs in 2016 (14.38 percent). Panel C of Table 2 provides the 
industry distribution based on 2-digit GICS and highlights that no one industry dominates the 
sample. The materials industry comprises the greatest proportion of firms within the sample 
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(19.91 percent) followed by consumer discretionary (17.42 percent). Telecommunication 
services comprise the lowest number of firms within the sample (0.74 percent). This 
distribution is representative of the Australian setting and consistent with Matolcsy and Wright 
(2007).  
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the total sample. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom five percent in order to reduce the effect of outliers.13 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Of the dependent variables, the mean Bonus Ratio is 0.939, implying that CEOs in this 
sample are able to arrange an average bonus of 93.9% of their base salary, with a maximum of 
511%. The mean Non_Fin. Ratio is 0.371, suggesting on average CEOs have 37.1% of their 
potential ex post cash bonus payout attributed to non-financial performance targets. The non-
financial ratio ranges from zero to 100%. Last, industry-adjusted ROA (ROAt+1(Ind-adj)) has 
a mean of 0.04% with a maximum of 17.6%.  
The key independent variables include the CEO Power Index and a breakdown of non-
financial performance targets into different categories. The mean CEO Power Index is 0.319. 
This value is higher than that documented in prior research (e.g., Abernethy et al., 2015), but 
incorporates other facets of CEO power, such as membership of the remuneration or 
nomination committees. Of the types of non-financial performance targets, 64.9% (41.3%) of 
firms incorporate qualitative (quantitative) targets, 44.5% do not highlight the non-financial 
targets that are being used (Undefined), and 33% use some form of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) targets.  
Next, we report the descriptive statistics on the individual components of CEO power. 
The average CEO Tenure is 5.465 years, which is consistent with prior literature (e.g., 
Abernethy et al., 2015; Lisic et al., 2016). The mean CEO Shareholdings are 2.5% of total 
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outstanding shares. The average Board Size of 6.590 is consistent with prior literature; 65.9% 
of the board consists of independent directors (%Independent). On average, the CEO is a 
member on one in five of the board’s subcommittees (CEO_Com of 19.5%), with a maximum 
of 100%. Of the firms in the sample, 15.7% (11.9%) of CEOs are a member of the nomination 
(remuneration) committee, and just over half of the CEOs in our sample have co-opted the 
remuneration committee (Coopted_Rem of 51.3%). The number of observations reported for 
On_Nom, On_Rem and Coopted_Rem are lower due to the fact that not all firms in the sample 
have nomination or remuneration committees. Last, the control variables are consistent with 
those in prior literature (Matolcsy & Wright, 2007; 2011). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix for all variables. As expected, as the CEO Power 
Index is constructed based on the eight individual measures of CEO power (CEO Tenure, CEO 
Shareholdings, Board Size, %Independent, CEO_Com, On_Nom, On_Rem and 
Coopted_Rem), significant correlations can be observed between these variables and CEO 
Power Index. The highest correlation is observed between On_Rem and CEO Power Index 
(0.583, p<0.01). Furthermore, as the likelihood of a board member being co-opted increases 
with the CEO’s tenure, it can be expected that CEO Tenure and the measure of co-option 
(Coopted_50), are positively correlated (0.491, p<0.01). A negative correlation can be 
observed between %Independent and CEO Power Index. This is consistent with prior literature 
and suggests that a greater proportion of independent directors limits the ability of CEOs to 
influence the board of directors (Abernethy et al., 2015; Lisic et al., 2016; Morse et al., 2011).  
The correlation between CEO Power Index and Bonus Ratio is positive and significant 
(0.046, p<0.10), and consistent with H1. Moreover, the correlation between CEO Power Index 
and the Non_Fin. Ratio is also in the predicted direction and significant (0.062, p<0.10), 
consistent with H2. Industry adjusted ROA is not correlated with Non_Fin. Ratio but is 
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positively correlated with Non_Fin. Ratio that includes measures of CSR (0.116, p<0.05). To 
ensure that multicollinearity is not a concern, VIF tests are conducted when running OLS 
regressions. 
4.3 Univariate analysis 
Table 5 presents a univariate analysis of the sample split at the 50th percentile (0.286) of the 
CEO Power Index. The top and bottom percentiles are classified as having high and low CEO 
power, respectively. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Bonus Ratio, Non_Fin. Ratio and industry-adjusted ROA are all significantly lower for 
the low power sub-sample in comparison to the high power sub-sample. This provides initial 
support for H1 and H2, that powerful CEOs are able to increase their cash bonus ratio and have 
greater levels of non-financial targets than less powerful CEOs. As expected, the CEO Power 
Index and its individual components differ significantly between the two subsamples. This 
suggests that the selected measures are appropriate representations of CEO power. Of the 
control variables, all firm characteristics, with the exception of Leverage and ΔSalary, do not 
differ significantly between the two subsamples. Consequently, it is unlikely that powerful 
CEOs self-select and choose firms with specific economic characteristics. Nevertheless, we 
conduct additional tests, reported in Section 6, to address this concern. 
5. Main results 
5.1 CEO power and the bonus ratio 
Table 6 reports the results of estimating model (1) with Bonus Ratio as the dependent variable. 
We estimate model (1) on the full sample and then on subsamples of firms that offer cash-only 
compensation (column (2)) and those that also use equity-based pay (column (3)).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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In column (1), the CEO Power Index coefficient is positive and significant (0.288, p<0.01), 
which increases in magnitude for the cash-only subsample (0.543, p<0.01) in column (2), and 
reduces for the equity subsample (0.167, p<0.01) in column (3). These results support H1 in 
that there is a positive association between CEO power and the Bonus Ratio. The greater 
association between CEO power and bonus ratio for the cash-only subsample is expected given 
that there is no equity component of compensation for these CEOs to manipulate, hence the 
cash bonus is the only way of obtaining higher compensation and is easier to justify to 
shareholders than an increase in salary. This notion is also supported by the reduction in the 
size of the coefficient for the equity-pay subsample. Since the equity component of CEO 
compensation is generally much larger than the cash bonus and easier to camouflage, CEOs 
that receive equity-based incentives are more likely to attempt to influence the equity 
component of their compensation than those who do not.14  
Of the control variables, the bonus ratio significantly increases with firm size  
(lnSizet-1) across all columns. However, in contrast to studies that find firms using a 
remuneration consultant pay their CEOs a greater proportion of total compensation as incentive 
payments (Grosse et al., 2019), this study finds that Consultant is inversely associated with the 
bonus ratio for the cash-only subsample but positively associated with bonus ratio for the equity 
subsample. This may be driven by the sample period, which extends before the Australian 
Treasury’s Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive 
Remuneration) Bill 2011, which from 2011 onwards requires companies to disclose details of 
remuneration consultants used. Last, the amount of cash holdings (lnCash) is positively 
associated with the bonus ratio for the equity subsample. 
5.2 CEO power and the use of non-financial performance targets 




[Insert Table 7 here] 
The CEO Power Index is positive and significant across all columns with the largest effect 
being on the cash-only subsample reported in column (2) (0.292, p<0.05). These results support 
H2, suggesting that powerful CEOs are able to negotiate a greater proportion of their cash 
bonus towards non-financial performance targets. The effect is lower for the equity subsample 
reported in column (3) (0.090, p<0.05) since it is likely that powerful CEOs would prefer to 
manipulate equity incentives that have a greater payout than cash bonus incentives. These 
findings are consistent with Abernethy et al. (2015) and Morse et al. (2011) who suggest that 
powerful CEOs are able to influence the conditions of their compensation arrangements.15  
The control variables report significant coefficients, which overall support the notion 
that powerful CEOs place greater weight on more attainable performance indicators (Morse et 
al., 2011). For example, the negative and significant coefficient on ROAt–1 across all columns 
suggests that when financial performance is easily attainable, bonus targets are more likely to 
be financial in nature. Second, the positive and significant coefficient on stdROAt–1 (1.751, 
p<0.01), which proxies for risk, suggests that the use of non-financial targets increases when 
financial performance measures are more volatile.  
5.3 The use of non-financial performance targets and subsequent firm performance 
Table 8 reports the results from estimating model (2), which examines the association between 
incorporating non-financial performance targets in cash bonus contracts and subsequent firm 
performance (measured as industry-adjusted ROA). We divide non-financial targets into 
specific categories, being Qualitative, Undefined, Quantitative, and CSR, and report the results 
of these dependent variables in columns (1) through (15) respectively. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
We find no association between the ratio of non-financial performance targets and firm 
performance in general, and are therefore rejecting H3a. When examining the types of non-
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financial targets used in cash bonus contracts, we also do not observe any relation between 
Qualitative targets used and firm performance. However, when firms disclose that they use 
non-financial targets in cash bonus contracts but do not define or describe what those targets 
are (Undefined), there is a negative and significant relation with subsequent firm performance 
across all subsamples. Therefore, we find partial support for H3b. This result is consistent with 
the excess compensation literature which suggests that CEOs attempt to camouflage rent 
extraction from shareholders and that such rent extraction is associated with negative 
performance consequences (Bugeja et al., 2017; Core et al., 1999). When non-financial targets 
are quantitative in nature (Quantitative), we find a positive and significant relation across all 
subsamples, supporting H3c. Finally, when non-financial targets relate to CSR, there is also a 
positive and significant relation to subsequent firm performance for all subsamples, supporting 
H3d. This result adds to the existing literature on CSR and firm performance (e.g., Edmans 
2011; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Lev et al, 2010) by documenting one channel through which 
higher firm performance is achieved, i.e., through the inclusion of CSR in performance-based 
pay. The control variables are largely consistent with prior literature.  
6. Additional analysis and robustness checks 
6.1 Controlling for endogeneity 
A possible concern with the results is that powerful CEOs self-select to firms with specific 
economic characteristics, which in turn affects their compensation arrangements. We attempt 
to address this concern in four ways. First, the univariate analysis between high and low CEO 
power subsamples in Table 5 shows no real difference in the economic characteristics of firms 
with high and low power CEOs. Second, an untabulated Hausman test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis, which states that the selected estimator is an efficient and consistent estimator of 
the true sample parameters to detect endogenous regressors. Nevertheless, we perform a two-
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stage Heckman estimation to evaluate the parameters of the regression model which may suffer 
from endogenous sample selection. The first-stage models the likelihood of a firm having a 
powerful CEO (columns (1) and (3)) using an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited 
by a big four audit firm (Big4) as an exogenous determinant of CEO power within a firm, 0 
otherwise. External auditors play an important monitoring role on behalf of shareholders and 
are essential in companies’ corporate governance (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright, 2002; 
Francis et al., 2003; Sloan, 2001). However, their value ultimately depends on the quality of 
the audit provided. We focus on Big4 auditors due to the overwhelming evidence that they 
provide higher quality monitoring (DeAngelo 1981, Krishnan 2003; Francis and Yu 2009). 
Following Cohen et al. (2002) we argue that Big4 directly impacts on firms’ corporate 
governance and operations (Cohen et al. 2002). We therefore use Big4 as a proxy for better 
corporate governance, which mitigates the ability of CEOs to establish power within the firm.  
We find that Big4 is negatively associated with CEO Power and contributes to 30% of the 
explanatory power (untabulated results). However, Big4 is not associated with the Bonus Ratio 
or Non.Fin_Ratio. Thus, we deem Big4 to be a suitable instrumental variable. 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
 The dependent variable in the first-stage (Power_50) is an indicator variable equal to 1 
if the CEO Power Index is above the median, and 0 otherwise. The second stage (columns (2) 
and (4)) report the results of model (1) after including the inverse Mills ratio. The coefficient 
on Big4 is negative and significant in columns (1) and (3), suggesting that there is monitoring 
by audit firms which restricts the level of power that CEOs are able to attain in these firms. In 
columns (2) and (4), the coefficients on Power_50 are positive and significant for Bonus Ratio 
and Non_Fin. Ratio, which is consistent with our previous findings. 
Last, we attempt to control for endogeneity by using a propensity score matched (PSM) 
subsample. We estimate the probability of having a powerful CEO based on all covariates in 
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model (1), then match firms with similar scores from the high and low CEO power 
subsamples.16  These results (untabulated) are consistent with our main results reported in 
Tables 6 and 7, which reduce our concern of endogeneity and reinforce our main findings that 
powerful CEOs influence the conditions of their cash bonus contracts. 
6.2 Alternate specifications 
A number of additional tests are conducted to confirm the robustness of the results 
(untabulated). First, the eight individual components of CEO power have been included as key 
independent variables on their own. Overall, the results support the notion that any single 
measure of power may not be able to capture the overall level of CEO influence (Abernethy et 
al., 2015; Finkelstein, 1992; Lisic et al., 2016; Morse et al., 2011). 
Second, the continuous measure of CEO power (CEO Power Index) has been measured 
using an indicator variable coded 1 if the CEO Power Index is in the 50th percentile of the 
sample, and 0 otherwise (Power_50). Results are robust and consistent with results initially 
presented in Table 6 and Table 7. Third, instead of applying the proportion of non-financial 
performance targets (Non_Fin. Ratio) as the dependent variable, we use the proportion of 
financial performance targets as the dependent variable (Fin. Ratio). Consistent with initial 
findings, the coefficient on CEO power (CEO Power Index) is negative and significant.  
Fourth, we use alternative measures of firm performance, including return on equity 
(ROE(t+1)) and buy and hold returns (BHAR(t+1)). Consistent with the main findings, we find 
that non-financial targets that are unclassified are negatively associated with ROE(t+1), while 
non-financial targets that are quantitative and focus on CSR performance are positively 
associated with ROE(t+1). The same findings do not hold consistently in the cash only and equity 
only sub-sample. Moreover, we do not find that non-financial measures are associated with 
BHAR(t+1). Overall, these findings support the view that cash bonus compensation is less likely 
to come under public scrutiny as they are justified by various measures of performance and 
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shareholders do not seem to differentiate between the types of non-financial targets used. To 
further support this claim, we hand-collected data on say-on-pay votes the CEO’s 
compensation. Although such votes enable shareholders to have a substantial role in aligning 
shareholder and executive interests (Collins et al., 2019), we only find 15 instances (2.18%) 
where shareholders penalised CEOs who have non-financial measures in their bonus contracts, 
by voting against their compensation (first strike). None received a second strike. This is 
substantially lower than reported in prior literature which examines the association between 
equity-based incentives and shareholder say-on-pay outcomes, which may suggest that 
shareholders are apathetic or uninformed in their monitoring role in regards to cash bonuses 
(e.g. Collins et al., 2019). This finding further supports the contention that cash bonuses can 
provide an avenue for CEOs to camouflage their compensation. 
6.3 Long-term versus short-term non-financial targets 
Finally, we examine whether non-financial targets which have a long-term focus versus those 
with a short-term focus have implications for subsequent firm performance. 17  The 
classification of non-financial measures into long-term and short-term is problematic since 
most of the non-financial targets may have both short- and long-term implications. For 
example, the CEO decreased the number of injuries this year by implementing a number of 
safety procedures. These safety procedures extend to the following years, hence injuries in 
subsequent years will also be lower. Further, developing strategic initiatives in the short-term, 
also has long-term consequences when these initiatives are implemented. Nevertheless, we try 
to address the long-term implications of non-financial targets by creating an indicator variable 
Long-term strategy, which is equal to 1 only if the firm explicitly states that the non-financial 
target is ‘long-term’, and 0 otherwise. We do not find a positive and significant coefficient on 
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Long-term strategy. This result could be due to the fact that only 2.91% of firms have Long-
term strategy in our sample. 
6.4 Ex post bonus payouts 
To triangulate our results, we further examine the association between CEO power, non-
financial performance targets and the realised (ex post) bonus payout. We find that CEOs with 
high power are associated with greater ex post cash bonus payouts. Untabulated results suggest 
that powerful CEOs achieve greater bonus payouts through the use of discretionary, non-
financial targets. Specifically, we find that CEOs who are compensated with a majority of non-
financial targets achieve a greater proportion of their bonus contract (60 percent) compared to 
CEOs with a majority of financial targets (50 percent). 18  Furthermore, CEOs on average 
achieve 10 percent more of their bonus contract if these non-financial targets are undefined 
(49.5 percent compared to 58.6 percent). In contrast, performance targets which are 
quantitative and are less likely to allow for manipulation by powerful CEOs result in lower 
cash bonus achievements (48.9 percent) compared to qualitative targets (57.1 percent). 
Anecdotal evidence supports this contention. In 2016, Insurance Australia Group CEO, Peter 
Harmer achieved approximately 70 percent of his bonus for the year as he, among other factors, 
demonstrated the ‘IAG Spirit’. This resulted in a cash bonus payment of $1.2 million for the 
year despite IAG reporting the lowest net profit after tax, ROA and ROE since 2012. Overall, 
these results are consistent with the contention that powerful CEOs use the conditions of cash 
bonus contracts to camouflage high compensation levels. 
7. Conclusion 
This study examines whether powerful CEOs influence the conditions of their cash bonus 
contracts. First, based on a sample of 1,085 firm years of ASX 500 firms, CEO power is found 
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to be positively associated with the ex ante bonus ratio and the use of non-financial 
performance targets into cash bonus contracts. The effects are greater for firms that pay cash-
only compensation. Second, we find that the proportion of cash bonus weighted against non-
financial performance targets is not related to subsequent firm performance; however, non-
financial targets that are quantitative or related to CSR are positively related to subsequent firm 
performance. These results support the view that measurable targets, which are less easily 
manipulated, as well as targets related to CSR, translate to increased subsequent firm 
performance (e.g., Cook et al. 2019; Edmans, 2011; Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Lev et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, firms that do not provide any information regarding the types of non-financial 
performance targets used in cash bonus contracts experience lower subsequent firm 
performance, which suggests that these firms are attempting to camouflage high CEO 
compensation levels. While our results are robust to controls for endogeneity including a two-
stage least squares estimation and propensity score-matched subsamples, we cannot completely 
rule out the endogeneity problem, which is a limitation of this study.  
This study contributes to the literature that examines the relative importance of 
managerial power and efficient contracting theory in determining CEO compensation. 
Specifically, our findings illustrate that, although CEOs influence the conditions of their cash 
bonus arrangement, non-financial performance targets do not necessarily impact firm 
performance negatively. However, qualitative and undefined non-financial performance targets 
appear to be less effective at incentivising CEOs. This supports shareholders’ concerns 
regarding bonus payouts associated with unjustified non-financial performance targets. Future 
research may examine whether our results hold on equity-based compensation contracts which 
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TABLE 1       Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Dependent variables 
Bonus Ratio The maximum ex ante cash bonus available to the CEO 
as a proportion of base salary as stated in the firm’s 
remuneration report; 
Non_Fin. Ratio The proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-
financial targets of performance as stated in the firm’s 
remuneration report; 
ROAt+1(Ind-adj) Industry-adjusted earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets; 
  
Panel B: Key independent variable 
CEO Power Index A measure of CEO power composed of the sum of eight 
individual components divided by the maximum 
components available to the CEO*. The sum is 
established based on the following indicator variables 
coded 1 if: (i) CEO Tenure ≥ 75th percentile; (ii) CEO 
Shareholding ≥ 75th percentile; (iii) Board Size ≥ 75th 
percentile; (iv) %Independent ≤ 75th percentile; (v) 
CEO_Com ≥ 75th percentile; (vi) On_Nom = 1; (vii) 
On_Rem =1; (viii) Coopted_Rem = 1; 
*Some firms do not have a remuneration and (nor) 
nomination committee and CEOs of these firms are only 
able to achieve a maximum of 7(6) components. 
Qualitative An indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target 
is non-quantifiable (these include: Improve staff 
engagement, Talent management, Demonstrate 
leadership skills, People and culture, Succession 
planning, Strategic planning, Response to 
competition/competitive environment, Sustainability, 
Environmental and Stakeholder engagement), 0 
otherwise; 
Undefined An indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target 
is not specified, 0 otherwise; 
Quantitative An indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target 
is quantifiable (these include: OH&S targets, Decrease 
injury rates, Operation performance/operational 
excellence, Growth and new market development, 
Compliance with governance standards, Customer 
satisfaction and Quality of recommendations), 0 
otherwise; 
CSR An indicator variable coded 1 if non-financial targets 
capture CSR activities (these include: OH&S targets, 
Decrease injury rates, Compliance with governance 
40 
 
standards, Customer satisfaction, Improve staff 
engagement, Talent management, People and culture, 
Sustainability, Environmental and Stakeholder 
engagement), 0 otherwise; 
  
Panel C: CEO Power Index 
CEO Tenure The number of years in which the CEO has been 
employed as the CEO; 
CEO Shareholding The number of shares held by the CEO divided by total 
outstanding shares; 
Board Size The number of directors on the board of directors 
excluding the CEO; 
%Independent The number of independent directors on the board 
divided by the total number of directors on the board; 
CEO_Com The number of committees of which the CEO is a 
member divided by the total number of committees 
established by the firm; 
On_Nom An indicator variable coded 1 if the CEO is a member of 
the nomination committee, 0 otherwise; 
On_Rem An indicator variable coded 1 if the CEO is a member of 
the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise; 
Coopted_Rem An indicator variable coded 1 if more than 50 percent of 
the remuneration committee has been co-opted, 0 
otherwise; 
  
Panel D: Control variables 
ROAt–1 Earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; 
lnSize t–1 The natural log of total assets; 
stdROA t–1 The standard deviation of return on asset (ROA) 
measured earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets; 
lnCash t–1 The natural log of cash flow from operations scaled by 
total assets; 
Return t–1 Annual stock return; 
Leverage t–1 Total long-term debt divided by total shareholders’ 
equity; 
M/B t–1 The market price of outstanding shares divided by total 
shareholders’ equity; 
∆Salary The annual percentage change in the individual CEO’s 
base salary; 
Consultant An indicator variable coded 1 if the firm employed an 
external remuneration consultant during the financial 





TABLE 2  Sample construction 
Panel A Sample selection 
 n 
ASX500 firms from 2004 to 2016 from Connect4 database  3,158 
 Less: Firms that do not disclose information on bonus compensation in their 
annual reports 
(1,436) 
 Less: Firms that explicitly state that they do not provide bonus 
compensation  
(154) 
 Less: CEOs paid from another firm (5) 
 Less: Firms with co-CEOs (26) 
 Less: Firms where CEO replaced during year (54) 
 Less: Firms with missing data to run model (1) (398) 
Sample to test H1  1,085 
         Less: Firms without data to calculate non-financial targets (398) 
Sample to test H2 and H3a–d 687 
 
Panel B Sample distribution by year 
Year n Percentage 
2004 2 1.843 
2005 37 3.410 
2006 42 3.871 
2007 50 4.608 
2008 60 5.530 
2009 63 5.806 
2010 82 7.558 
2011 91 8.839 
2012 108 9.954 
2013 117 10.783 
2014 140 12.903 
2015 137 12.627 
2016 156 14.378 
Total 1,085 100.000 
 
Panel C Sample distribution by industry (2 digit GICS) 
Industry n Percentage 
Energy 73 6.728 
Materials 216 19.908 
Industrials 146 13.456 
Consumer Discretionary 189 17.419 
Consumer Staples 88 8.111 
Health Care 77 7.097 
Financials 118 10.876 
Information Technology 69 6.359 
Telecommunication Services 2 0.737 
Utilities 19 1.751 
Real Estate 88 8.111 
Total 1,085 100.000 
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TABLE 3  Descriptive statistics 
 Full sample Cash sample Equity sample 
 n Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max n Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max n Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent variables:                
Bonus Ratio 1,085 0.939 0.604 0.135 5.108 259 0.929 0.775 0.135 3.000 826 0.942 0.539 0.165 5.108 
Non_Fin. Ratio 687 0.371 0.235 0.000 1.000 157 0.354 0.338 0.000 1.000 530 0.376 0.195 0.000 1.000 
ROAt+1(Ind-adjusted) 687 0.004 0.053 –0.150 0.176 157 0.008 0.059 –0.129 0.152 530 0.004 0.0516 –0.150 0.176 
Key Independent 
Variables: 
            
CEO Power Index 1,085 0.319 0.191 0.000 1.000 259 0.352 0.203 0.000 1.000 826 0.309 0.186 0.000 0.875 
Qualitative 687 0.649 0.478 0.000 1.000 157 0.478 0.501 0.000 1.000 530 0.700 0.459 0.000 1.000 
Undefined 687 0.445 0.497 0.000 1.000 157 0.516 0.501 0.000 1.000 530 0.425 0.495   0.000 1.000 
Quantitative 687 0.413 0.493 0.000 1.000 157 0.338 0.474 0.000 1.000 530 0.436 0.496 0.000 1.000 
CSR 687 0.330 0.471 0.000 1.000 157 0.242 0.430 0.000 1.000 530 0.357 0.479   0.000 1.000 
Big4 980 0.664 0.472 0.000 1.000 227 0.586 0.494 0.000 1.000 753 0.688 0.464 0.000 1.000 
CEO Power Individual 
Measures: 
            
CEO Tenure 1,085 5.465 4.940 0.000 33.000 259 6.668 6.794 0.000 33.000 826 5.088 4.127 0.000 22.000 
CEO Shareholding 1,085 0.025 0.076 0.000 0.669 259 0.0726 0.130 0.000 0.669 826 0.0102 0.0378 0.000 0.552 
Board Size 1,085 6.590 2.035 2.000 15.000 259 5.807 1.792 2.000 12.000 826 6.835 2.046 2.000 15.000 
%Independent 1,085 0.663 0.273 0.000 1.000 259 0.578 0.277 0.000 1.000 826 0.690 0.266 0.000 1.000 
CEO_Com 1,085 0.195 0.277 0.000 1.000 259 0.180 0.280 0.000 1.000 826 0.200 0.276 0.000 1.000 
On_Nom 973 0.157 0.364 0.000 1.000 203 0.153 0.361 0.000 1.000 770 0.158 0.365 0.000 1.000 
On_Rem 1,039 0.119 0.324 0.000 1.000 248 0.157 0.365 0.000 1.000 791 0.107 0.310 0.000 1.000 
Coopted_Rem 1,006 0.513 0.500 0.000 1.000 245 0.563 0.497 0.000 1.000 761 0.497 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Control Variables:                
ROAt–1 1,085 0.072 0.056 –0.054 0.187 259 0.074 0.061 –0.054 0.187 826 0.071 0.054 –0.054 0.187 
Sizet–1 (million) 1,085 4,510 13,000 3.959 135,000 259 1,310 2,620 3.959 27,400 826 5,510 14,700 13.100 135,000 
lnSize t–1 1,085 20.680 1.640 17.740 23.560 259 19.890 1.463 17.740 23.560 826 20.930 1.608 17.740 23.560 
stdROA t–1 1,085 0.061 0.058 0.010 0.221 259 0.064 0.060 0.010 0.221 826 0.060 0.057 0.010 0.221 
lnCasht–1 1,085 0.084 0.074  –0.063 0.242 259 0.078 0.085 –0.063 0.242 826 0.086 0.070 –0.063 0.242 
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Returnt–1 1,085   0.157  0.437 –0.530 1.250 259 0.225 0.488 –0.530 1.250 826 0.136 0.418 –0.530 1.250 
Leveraget–1 1,085 0.501 0.488 0.000 1.880 259 0.453 0.500 0.000 1.880 826 0.515 0.484 0.000 1.880 
M/Bt–1 1,085 2.444 1.985 0.520 7.940 259 2.577 2.022 0.520 7.940 826 2.402 1.973 0.520 7.940 
Consultant 1,085 0.603 0.490 0.000 1.000 259 0.425 0.495 0.000 1.000 826 0.659 0.474 0.000 1.000 
∆Salary 1,085 0.116 0.191 –0.051 0.731 259 0.110 0.200 –0.051 0.731 826 0.118 0.188 –0.051 0.731 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the main results of this study for the full sample (1,085), cash sample (259) and equity sample (826). 
Bonus Ratio is the maximum ex ante cash bonus available to the CEO as a proportion of base salary as stated in the firm’s remuneration report; Non_Fin. Ratio is the proportion 
of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial targets of performance as stated in the firm’s remuneration report; ROAt+1(Ind-adjusted) is the industry-adjusted earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets; CEO Power Index is a measure of CEO power composed of the sum of eight individual components divided by the maximum components 
available to the CEO. The sum is established based on the following indicator variables coded 1 if: (i) CEO Tenure ≥ 75th percentile; (ii) CEO Shareholding ≥ 75th percentile; (iii) 
Board Size ≥ 75th percentile; (iv) %Independent ≤ 75th percentile; (v) CEO_Com ≥ 75th percentile; (vi) On_Nom = 1; (vii) On_Rem =1; (viii) Coopted_Rem=1; 
Qualitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is non-quantifiable, 0 otherwise; Undefined is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is not 
specified, 0 otherwise; Quantitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is quantifiable, 0 otherwise; CSR is an indicator variable coded 1 if non-financial 
targets capture CSR activities, 0 otherwise; CEO Tenure is the number of years in which the CEO has been employed as CEO; CEO Shareholding is the number of shares held 
by the CEO divided by total outstanding shares; Board Size is the number of directors on the board of directors excluding the CEO; %Independent is the number of independent 
directors on the board divided by the total number of directors on the board; CEO_Com is the number of committees of which the CEO is a member divided by the total number 
of committees established by the firm; On_Nom is an indicator variable coded 1 if the CEO is a member of the nomination committee, 0 otherwise; On_Rem: is an indicator 
variable coded 1 if the CEO is a member of the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise; Coopted_Rem: is an indicator variable coded 1 if more than 50 percent of the remuneration 
committee has been co-opted, 0 otherwise; ROAt–1 is earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; lnSizet–1 is the natural log of total assets; stdROAt–1 is the standard 
deviation of return on asset (ROA) measured earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; Casht–1 is cash flow from operations; lnCasht–1 is the natural log of cash flow 
from operations scaled by total assets; Returnt–1 is annual stock return; Leveraget–1 is total long-term debt divided by total shareholders’ equity; M/Bt–1 is the market price of 
outstanding shares divided by total shareholders’ equity; Consultant is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm employed an external remuneration consultant during the financial 






TABLE 4      Correlation matrix 
  1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6   7 . 8 . 9 . 10 . 11 . 12 . 
1. Bonus Ratio 1 
                       
2. Non_Fin. Ratio 0.0579 * 1 
                     





                   
4. CEO Power Index 0.0458 * 0.0623 * 0.0428 
 
1 
                 
5. Qualitative 0.0826 *** 0.3167 *** –0.0129 
 
–0.0824 *** 1 
               
6. Undefined –0.0658 *** –0.2202 *** –0.0496 
 
0.082 *** –0.6787 *** 1  
            
7. Quantitative 0.0664 *** 0.1535 *** 0.051 
 
–0.0869 *** 0.5039 *** –0.8265 *** 1 
           
8. CSR 0.0654 *** 0.2263 *** 0.1161  ** –0.0596 *** 0.4933 *** –0.6693 *** 0.6927 *** 1 
         




0.1435  ** 0.481 *** 0.0251 
 





       
10. CEO Shareholding –0.0231 
 
–0.1064 *** 0.0719 * 0.3113 *** –0.077 *** 0.0771 *** –0.0887 *** –0.097 *** 0.2871 *** 1 
     












0.0556 *** 0.0644 *** –0.0335 
 
1 
   
12. Board size 0.1039 *** 0.0747  –0.1491 *** 0.0767 *** 0.1455 *** –0.1105 *** 0.0957 *** 0.0998 *** –0.1036 *** –0.2892 *** 0.132 *** 1  




–0.2751 *** 0.0987 *** –0.1062 *** 0.0935 *** 0.1097 *** 0.0222 
 
–0.08 *** 0.0376 * .0.0308 ** 










0.0574 ** –0.0251 
 
0.389 *** –0.0493 
 
15. On_Rem 0.0674 *** 0.0768 ** 0.0332 
 
0.5825 *** –0.0461 ** 0.0189 
 
–0.0494 ** 0.0186 
 
0.1332 *** 0.1123 *** 0.4732 *** –0.132 *** 










–0.0396 ** 0.4908 *** 0.1772 *** 0.0378 * –0.0649 *** 
17. ROAt–1 0.0008 
 










0.0932 *** 0.0784 *** 0.019 
 
–0.1395 *** 
18. lnSizet–1 0.3522 *** 0.207 *** –0.1262  *** 0.0117 
 
0.2302 *** –0.1482 *** 0.1362 *** 0.142 *** –0.0442 
 
–0.2585 *** 0.1661 *** –0.6065 *** 
19. stdROAt–1 –0.1838 *** 0.1831 *** 0.1176  *** –0.0067 
 




0.0504 * –0.0875 *** 0.1015 *** –0.0591 * –0.171 
 
20. lnCasht–1 –0.0081 
 

























0.1502 *** –0.0251 
 
–0.1207 *** 
22. Leveraget–1 0.1771 *** 0.0852 ** –0.0568 
 




–0.0537 * –0.0734 ** 0.0523 * –0.222 *** 
23. M/Bt–1 –0.0669 ** –0.0475 
 




0.1037 *** –0.0773 ** –0.0703 ** 0.0292 
 
0.0907 *** –0.0182 
 
–0.1267 *** 




–0.0838 ** –0.0433 
 












–0.0396 * 0.0437 ** –0.042 * 0.0652 *** 0.0691 *** –0.0156 
 










 13. . 14. . 15. . 16. . 17. . 18. . 19. . 20. . 21. . 22. . 23. . 24. 25. 
13. %Indepdent 1.0000                        
14. On_Nom –0.0169  1.0000                      
15. On_Rem –0.0682 *** 0.6245 *** 1.0000                    
16. Coopted_Rem –0.0237  0.0303  0.0278  1.0000                  
17. ROAt–1 0.0221  0.0458  0.0391  0.0588 * 1.0000                
18. lnSizet–1 0.1510 *** –0.0279  –0.0666 ** –0.0867 *** –0.1780 *** 1.0000              
19. stdROAt–1 –0.0813 *** 0.0045  –0.0702 ** 0.0748 ** –0.0804 *** –0.3828 *** 1.0000            
20. lnCasht–1 0.0656 ** 0.0267  0.0479  0.0926 *** 0.6757 *** –0.1674 *** 0.0387  1.0000          
21. Returnt–1 –0.0060  0.0153  0.0579 * 0.0895 *** 0.1475 *** –0.1664 *** 0.0840 *** 0.1339   *** 1.0000        
22. Leveraget–1 –0.0174  –0.0077  0.0205  –0.0495  –0.0980 *** 0.3467 *** –0.2699 *** –0.1810   *** –0.0604  ** 1.0000      
23. M/Bt–1 0.0163  –0.0802 * –0.0343  0.0933 *** 0.3998 *** –0.2531 *** 0.1556 *** 0.2986   *** 0.3217  *** 0.0873 *** 1.0000    
24. ∆Salary –0.0339  0.0516  0.0369  –0.1347 *** –0.0005  –0.0559 * 0.0333  –0.0212  0.0978  *** –0.0295  0.0555 * 1.0000  
25. Consultant 0.1522 *** –0.0179  –0.0472 ** 0.0000  0.0008  0.1583 *** –0.0944 *** 0.0467  –0.0454  0.1887 *** 0.0853 *** 0.0033 1 
This table presents the correlations for all variables.  Bonus Ratio is the maximum ex ante cash bonus available to the CEO as a proportion of base salary as stated in the firm’s remuneration report; Non_Fin. 
Ratio is the proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial targets of performance as stated in the firm’s remuneration report; ROAt+1(Ind-adjusted) is the industry-adjusted earnings before interest 
and tax divided by total assets; CEO Power Index is a measure of CEO power composed of the sum of eight individual components divided by the maximum components available to the CEO. The sum is 
established based on the following indicator variables coded 1 if: (i) CEO Tenure ≥ 75th percentile; (ii) CEO Shareholding ≥ 75th percentile; (iii) Board Size ≥ 75th percentile; (iv) %Independent ≤ 75th 
percentile; (v) CEO_Com ≥ 75th percentile; (vi) On_Nom = 1; (vii) On_Rem =1; (viii) Coopted_Rem=1; Qualitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is non-quantifiable, 0 otherwise; 
Undefined is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is not specified, 0 otherwise;  Quantitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is quantifiable, 0 otherwise; CSR 
is an indicator variable coded 1 if non-financial targets capture CSR activities, 0 otherwise; CEO Tenure is the number of years in which the CEO has been employed as CEO; CEO Shareholding is the 
number of shares held by the CEO divided by total outstanding shares; Board Size is the number of directors on the board of directors excluding the CEO; %Independent is the number of independent 
directors on the board divided by the total number of directors on the board; CEO_Com is the number of committees of which the CEO is a member divided by the total number of committees established 
by the firm; On_Nom is an indicator variable coded 1 if the CEO is a member of the nomination committee, 0 otherwise; On_Rem: is an indicator variable coded 1 if the CEO is a member of the remuneration 
committee, 0 otherwise; Coopted_Rem: is an indicator variable coded 1 if more than 50 percent of the remuneration committee has been co-opted, 0 otherwise; ROAt–1 is earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets; lnSizet–1 is the natural log of total assets; stdROAt–1 is the standard deviation of return on asset (ROA) measured earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; Casht–1 is cash 
flow from operations; lnCasht–1 is the natural log of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; Returnt–1 is annual stock return; Leveraget–1 is total long–term debt divided by total shareholders’ equity; 
M/Bt–1 is the market price of outstanding shares divided by total shareholders’ equity; Consultant is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm employed an external remuneration consultant during the financial 
year, 0 otherwise; ∆Salary is the annual percentage change in the individual CEO’s base salary.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5 percent. 
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 n Mean Obs. Mean 
Statistical 
difference 
Dependent variables:      
Bonus Ratio 566 0.892 519 0.990 –2.686*** 
Non_Fin. Ratio 368 0.352 315 0.391 –2.221** 
ROAt+1(Ind-adjusted) 368 0.001 315 0.009 –2.040** 
Key Independent Variables:     
CEO Power Index 566 0.171 519 0.481 –45.839*** 
Qualitative 368 0.625 315 0.673    –1.309 
Undefined 368 0.446 315 0.444     0.032 
Quantitative 368 0.424 315 0.406     0.464 
CSR 368 0.313 315 0.352    –1.104 
CEO Power Individual Measures:      
CEO Tenure 566 3.541 519 7.565 –14.668*** 
CEO Shareholding 566 0.011  519 0.041  –6.540*** 
Board Size 566 6.276 519 6.933 –5.379*** 
%Independent 566 0.729 519 0.590 8.667*** 
CEO_Com 566 0.093 519 0.306 –13.720*** 
On_Nom 515 0.029 458 0.301 –12.535*** 
On_Rem 550 0.020 489 0.231 –11.066*** 
Coopted_Rem 550 0.262 489 0.789 –19.641*** 
Control Variables:      
ROAt–1 566 0.070 519 0.073    –0.821 
lnSize t–1 566 20.633 519 20.730    –0.975 
stdROA t–1 566 0.060 519 0.061    –0.445 
lnCasht–1 566 0.085 519 0.084     0.154 
Returnt–1 566 0.144 519 0.172    –1.058 
Leveraget–1 566 0.461 519 0.544   –2.802*** 
M/Bt–1 566 2.423 519 2.467    –0.367 
Consultant 566 0.601 519 0.605    –0.145 
∆Salary 566 0.133 519 0.098    3.060*** 
This table presents the results of differences in means and medians for all variables in the regression model 
for firms that have a CEO with high CEO power versus low CEO power. A test of statistical difference for 
firms with CEOs with high CEO power versus those with CEOs with low CEO power is also shown. A t–
test is used for continuous variables and a χ2-test for indicator variables. The *, ** and *** represent 
statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent levels, respectively. Bonus Ratio is the maximum ex 
ante cash bonus available to the CEO as a proportion of base salary as stated in the firm’s remuneration 
report; Non_Fin. Ratio is the proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial targets of 
performance as stated in the firm’s remuneration report; ROAt+1(Ind-adjusted) is the industry-adjusted 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; CEO Power Index is a measure of CEO power 
composed of the sum of eight individual components divided by the maximum components available to the 
CEO. The sum is established based on the following indicator variables coded 1 if: (i) CEO Tenure ≥ 75th 
percentile; (ii) CEO Shareholding ≥ 75th percentile; (iii) Board Size ≥ 75th percentile; (iv) %Independent ≤ 
75th percentile; (v) CEO_Com ≥ 75th percentile; (vi) On_Nom = 1; (vii) On_Rem =1; (viii) Coopted_Rem=1; 
Qualitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is non-quantifiable, 0 otherwise; 
Undefined is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is not specified, 0 otherwise; 
Quantitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is quantifiable, 0 otherwise; CSR is 
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an indicator variable coded 1 if non-financial targets capture CSR activities, 0 otherwise; CEO Tenure is the 
number of years in which the CEO has been employed as CEO; CEO Shareholding is the number of shares 
held by the CEO divided by total outstanding shares; Board Size is the number of directors on the board of 
directors excluding the CEO; %Independent is the number of independent directors on the board divided by 
the total number of directors on the board; CEO_Com is the number of committees of which the CEO is a 
member divided by the total number of committees established by the firm; On_Nom is an indicator variable 
coded 1 if the CEO is a member of the nomination committee, 0 otherwise; On_Rem is an indicator variable 
coded 1 if the CEO is a member of the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise; Coopted_Rem is an indicator 
variable coded 1 if more than 50 percent of the remuneration committee has been co-opted, 0 otherwise; 
ROAt–1  is earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; lnSizet–1 is the natural log of total assets; 
stdROAt–1 is the standard deviation of return on asset (ROA) measured earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets; Casht–1 is cash flow from operations; lnCasht–1 is the natural log of cash flow from 
operations scaled by total assets; Returnt–1 is the annual stock return; Leveraget–1 is total long-term debt 
divided by total shareholders’ equity; M/Bt– is the market price of outstanding shares divided by total 
shareholders’ equity; Consultant is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm employed an external 
remuneration consultant during the financial year, 0 otherwise; ∆Salary is the annual percentage change in 























































     
Constant  –1.801*** –1.620* –2.250*** 
  (–6.223) (–1.935) (–10.708) 
CEO Power Index + 0.288*** 0.543*** 0.167*** 
  (5.391) (3.635) (3.168) 
ROA t–1 + 0.118 0.937 –0.850 
  (0.194) (0.664) (–1.530) 
lnSize t–1 + 0.120*** 0.109** 0.141*** 
  (7.809) (2.919) (13.812) 
stdROA t–1 +/– –0.208 1.358 –0.689** 
  (–1.025) (1.750) (–2.870) 
lnCash t–1 + 0.515 –0.737 1.290*** 
  (1.248) (–1.008) (3.794) 
Return t–1 + 0.053 0.063 0.027 
  (1.155) (0.679) (0.492) 
Leverage t–1 +/– 0.049 0.098 –0.014 
  (1.079) (0.712) (–0.434) 
M/B t–1 + 0.004 –0.011 0.020* 
  (0.366) (–0.451) (1.911) 
Consultant + –0.017 –0.264*** 0.078** 
  (–0.905) (–3.415) (2.918) 
∆Salary – –0.103 –0.103 –0.094 
  (–1.452) (–0.596) (–1.124) 
     
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes 
     
n  1,085 259 826 
Adjusted R-squared  0.189 0.177 0.260 
This table presents the results for Model (1) with Bonus Ratio as the dependent variable and tests the influence of 
CEO power on CEOs’ cash bonus ratio. The regression is specified as: 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑_50 +  𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 × 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑_50         (1) 
 +𝛽4−12 ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽13−25𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽26−35𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖  
 
Bonus Ratio is the maximum ex ante cash bonus available to the CEO as a proportion of base salary as stated in the 
firm’s remuneration report; CEO Power Index is a measure of CEO power composed of the sum of eight individual 
components divided by the maximum components available to the CEO. The sum is established based on the 
following indicator variables coded 1 if: (i) CEO Tenure ≥ 75th percentile; (ii) CEO Shareholding ≥ 75th percentile; 
(iii) Board Size ≥ 75th percentile; (iv) %Independent ≤ 75th percentile; (v) CEO_Com ≥ 75th percentile; (vi) 
On_Nom = 1; (vii) On_Rem =1; (viii) Coopted_Rem=1; ROAt–1 is earnings before interest and tax divided by total 
assets; lnSizet–1 is the natural log of total assets; stdROAt–1 is the standard deviation of return on asset (ROA) 
measured earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; Casht–1 is cash flow from operations; lnCasht–1: is 
the natural log of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; Returnt–1 is annual stock return; Leveraget–1: is 
total long-term debt divided by total shareholders’ equity; M/Bt–1 is the market price of outstanding shares divided 
by total shareholders’ equity; Consultant is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm employed an external 
remuneration consultant during the financial year, 0 otherwise; ∆Salary is the annual percentage change in the 
individual CEO’s base salary. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5 percent. Standard 














     
Constant  –0.605*** –0.717 –0.547** 
  (–3.441) (–1.009) (–2.388) 
CEO Power Index + 0.091** 0.292* 0.090** 
  (2.550) (2.093) (2.379) 
ROA t–1 – –0.329* –0.896* –0.389** 
  (–1.920) (–2.013) (–2.629) 
lnSize t–1 + 0.042*** 0.045 0.040*** 
  (5.941) (1.628) (4.509) 
stdROA t–1 +/– 1.445*** 1.971*** 1.145*** 
  (9.139) (5.612) (4.847) 
lnCash t–1 + 0.273* 0.751 0.216 
  (1.823) (1.688) (1.433) 
Return t–1 + 0.011 0.061 –0.016 
  (0.387) (1.322) (–0.439) 
Leverage t–1 +/– –0.027* 0.071 –0.040* 
  (–2.123) (1.670) (–1.924) 
M/B t–1 – 0.002 –0.023 0.012 
  (0.302) (–1.552) (1.500) 
Consultant + –0.028** –0.008 –0.024 
  (–2.949) (–0.136) (–1.780) 
∆Salary – –0.112** –0.247* –0.059 
  (–2.831) (–2.058) (–1.130) 
     
Year controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls  Yes Yes Yes 
     
n  687 157 530 
Adjusted R-squared  0.148 0.298 0.135 
This table presents the results for Model (1) with Non_Fin. Ratio as the dependent variable and tests the 
influence of CEO power on the proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial performance targets. 
The regression is specified as: 
 
    𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝑖𝑛.  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑_50  +  𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 × 𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑50 (1) 
   +𝛽4−12 ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽13−25𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽26−35𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖  
 
Non_Fin. Ratio is the proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial targets of performance as stated 
in the firm’s remuneration report; ROAt+1(Ind-adjusted) is industry-adjusted earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets; CEO Power Index is a measure of CEO power composed of the sum of eight individual 
components divided by the maximum components available to the CEO. The sum is established based on the 
following indicator variables coded 1 if: (i) CEO Tenure ≥ 75th percentile; (ii) CEO Shareholding ≥ 75th 
percentile; (iii) Board Size ≥ 75th percentile; (iv) %Independent ≤ 75th percentile; (v) CEO_Com ≥ 75th 
percentile; (vi) On_Nom = 1; (vii) On_Rem =1; (viii) Coopted_Rem=1; ROAt–1 is earnings before interest and tax 
divided by total assets; lnSizet–1 is the natural log of total assets; stdROAt–1 is the standard deviation of return on 
asset (ROA) measured earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; Casht–1 is cash flow from 
operations; lnCasht–1: is the natural log of cash flow from operations scaled by total assets; Returnt–1 is annual 
stock return; Leveraget–1 is total long-term debt divided by total shareholders’ equity; M/Bt–1 is the market price 
of outstanding shares divided by total shareholders’ equity; Consultant is an indicator variable coded 1 if the 
firm employed an external remuneration consultant during the financial year, 0 otherwise; ∆Salary is the annual 
percentage change in the individual CEO’s base salary. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 5 percent. Standard errors are clustered by year. 
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TABLE 8  The impact of including non-financial performance targets in bonus contracts on subsequent firm performance 
 Full sample Cash sample Equity sample 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Constant 0.007 0.009 0.035 0.012 0.025 0.169*** 0.160*** 0.180*** 0.162*** 0.137*** –0.073 –0.063 –0.027 –0.063 –0.036 
 –0.096 –0.157 –0.76 –0.199 –0.496 –3.766 –5.155 –4.194 –3.358 –2.659 (–1.573) (–1.502) (–0.956) (–1.534) (–0.701) 
Non_Fin. Ratio –0.009      –0.007      –0.016     
 (–0.453)      (–0.271)      (–0.697)     
Qualitative  0.001      0.001      0.004    
  –0.197      –0.121      –0.584    
Undefined   –0.014***      –0.019**      –0.011**   
   (–3.609)      (–2.047)      (–2.541)   
Quantitative    0.010*      0.021*      0.008**  
    –1.779      –1.755      –2.123  
CSR     0.014**     0.024**     0.008* 
     –2.564     –2.28     –1.682 
                  
lnSize t–1 –0.001 –0.001 –0.002 –0.001 –0.002 –0.008*** –0.008*** –0.009*** 0.002 –0.007*** 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (–0.236) (–0.394) (–0.867) (–0.506) (–0.880) (–3.574) (–5.258) (–3.945) –1.184 (–3.209) –1.431 –1.221 –0.597 –1.184 –0.398 
stdROA t–1 –0.094 –0.104* –0.097* –0.113* –0.114* –0.262 –0.255 –0.211 –0.072* –0.228** –0.042 –0.062* –0.061** –0.072* –0.068 
 (–1.659) (–1.788) (–1.876) (–1.853) (–1.681) (–1.622) (–1.586) (–1.358) (–1.861) (–2.264) (–1.587) (–1.911) (–2.222) (–1.861) (–0.957) 
Leverage t–1 –0.015*** –0.015*** –0.013*** –0.015*** –0.013** –0.020* –0.020* –0.020** –0.011*** –0.017** –0.012*** –0.011*** –0.009*** –0.011*** –0.010* 
 (–4.523) (–4.005) (–4.127) (–4.074) (–2.388) (–1.781) (–1.715) (–2.410) (–3.715) (–2.051) (–3.756) (–3.568) (–3.249) (–3.715) (–1.680) 
M/B t–1 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.011* 0.011* 0.011** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 –8.559 –8.808 –10.339 –9.19 –9.474 –1.903 –1.846 –2.056 –7.07 –2.856 –6.832 –6.986 –7.804 –7.07 –10.369 
                  
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
                  
n 687 687 687 687 687 157 157 157 157 157 530 530 530 530 530 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.18 0.179 0.206 0.187 0.203 0.287 0.281 0.289 0.199 0.294 0.197 0.194 0.218 0.199 0.212 
This table presents results for Model (2) which examines the performance consequences of incorporating various non-financial performance targets as part of CEOs’ bonus contract. The regression is 
specified as: 
           𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+1 (𝐼𝑛𝑑. 𝑎𝑑𝑗) =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑜𝑛_𝐹𝑖𝑛. 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 + 𝛽2−5∑𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠  +  𝛽5−18𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽19−28𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜖𝑖                                                                                                                                                (2)                 
 
ROAt+1(Ind-adj) is the industry-adjusted earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets; Non_Fin. Ratio is the proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial targets of performance as 
stated in the firm’s remuneration report; Qualitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is non-quantifiable, 0 otherwise;  Undefined is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-
financial target is not specified, 0 otherwise; Quantitative is an indicator variable coded 1 if the non-financial target is quantifiable, 0 otherwise; CSR is an indicator variable coded 1 if non-financial 




total assets; Leveraget–1 is total long-term debt divided by total shareholders’ equity; M/Bt–1 is the market price of outstanding shares divided by total shareholders’ equity. All continuous variables are 















Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Constant –0.620 –2.381*** –0.489 –0.708** 
 (–1.033) (–5.185) (–0.335) (–3.048) 
Big4 –0.187**  –0.243**  
 (–2.192)  (–2.514)  
Power_50  0.242***  0.061** 
  (3.608)  (2.523) 
Invmills  0.458*  0.050 
  (1.851)  (0.338) 
ROA t–1 1.808 0.560 2.867** –0.289 
 (1.405) (0.848) (2.106) (–0.833) 
lnSize t–1 0.018 0.127*** 0.036 0.047*** 
 (0.734) (8.584) (0.613) (5.778) 
stdROA t–1 0.852 0.045 0.649 1.182*** 
 (0.639) (0.201) (0.339) (5.129) 
lnCash t–1 –0.360 0.218 –0.609 0.056 
 (–0.369) (0.583) (–0.347) (0.297) 
Return t–1 0.106 0.093* 0.140 –0.008 
 (1.140) (1.829) (0.989) (–0.294) 
Leverage t–1 0.278*** 0.151* 0.043 –0.037 
 (3.584) (2.160) (0.493) (–1.406) 
M/B t–1 –0.036 –0.008 –0.085 0.012 
 (–1.358) (–0.770) (–1.308) (0.820) 
Consultant –0.041 –0.052*** –0.049 –0.022* 
 (–0.933) (–3.260) (–0.381) (–2.153) 
∆Salary –0.705*** –0.287** (–1.308) (0.820) 
 (–2.628) (–2.529) –0.311 –0.064 
     
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
n 980 980 628 481 
Pseudo R2 0.044  0.065  
Adjusted R-squared  0.180  0.118 
This table presents results for a Heckman 2SLS estimation which addresses the notion of self-selection. 
Columns (1) and (3) present the results for the first stage which estimates a probit regression for the 
determinants of CEO power where Power_50 is the dependent variable. Column (2) presents the results for 
the second stage which incorporates the Invmills estimated in the first stage and where Bonus Ratio is the 
dependent variable. Column (4) presents the results for the second stage which incorporates the Invmills 
estimates in the first stage and where Non-Fin Ratio is the dependent variable. N in columns (1), (2), (3) and 
(4) is different to prior tables as Big4 data is unavailable for some firms.  
Power_50 is an indicator variable coded 1 if CEO Power is greater than the median, 0 otherwise; Big4 is an 
indicator variable coded 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big4 audit firms, 0 otherwise; Bonus Ratio is the 
maximum ex ante cash bonus available to the CEO as a proportion of base salary as stated in the firm’s 
remuneration report; Non-Fin Ratio is the proportion of cash bonus weighted towards non-financial targets of 
performance as stated in the firm’s remuneration report; ROAt–1 is earnings before interest and tax divided by 
total assets; lnSizet–1 is the natural log of total assets; stdROAt–1 is the standard deviation of return on asset 
53 
 
(ROA) measured earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. lnCasht–1 is the natural log of cash 
flow from operations scaled by total assets; Returnt–1 is annual stock return; Leveraget–1 is total long-term debt 
divided by total shareholders’ equity; M/Bt–1 is the market price of outstanding shares divided by total 
shareholders’ equity; Consultant is an indicator variable coded 1 if the firm employed an external 
remuneration consultant during the financial year, 0 otherwise; ∆Salary is the annual percentage change in the 
individual CEO’s base salary. All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 5 percent. The *, 
** and *** represent statistical significance at the ten, five, one percent levels, respectively. Standard errors 






1 Figure 2.1 in Murphy (2013) illustrates that, while equity-based compensation comprises 21–32 percent of 
average total realised compensation of CEOs included in the S&P 500 in 2011, realised cash bonuses range 
between 20–24 percent. Similarly, Figure 2.3 illustrates that total cash compensation increased from USD 1.1 
million in 1970 to USD 4.1 million in 2011. 
2 This is partly driven by Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code 1986 which implements a USD 1 million 
tax deduction limit on CEO compensation arrangements. Nonetheless, equity-based incentives, such as stock 
option grants, qualify for the performance-based compensation exemption to Section 162(m). This exemption 
provides economic incentives that make equity-based compensation attractive to employers, as cash bonuses 
rarely qualify. The same exemption for equity-based compensation does not apply in Australia. 
3 While prior U.S. studies have shown that CEO duality increases CEO power, CEO duality is less common in 
Australia. We find that only one firm in our final sample (Reece Australia Limited) has a CEO who is also the 
chairman. This observation is not included in our final sample and as such, CEO duality is not included in our 
CEO Power Index. 
4 Matolcsy and Wright (2011) document that within the Australian setting, from 1999 to 2005, cash-only based 
incentives as well as equity-based incentives can be efficient based on the economic characteristics of firms. 
Furthermore, either incentive arrangement has negative performance consequences only if the firm has chosen an 
incentive arrangement that is inconsistent with its economic characteristics. 
5 We acknowledge that discretion still remains concerning the application of accounting standards; hence, we 
cannot rule out that some manipulation may occur in relation to financial targets. However, given industry 
comparisons, year-to-year trends, and external auditors, financial targets are less likely to be manipulated to the 
same degree as non-financial targets.  
6H2 is also tested using a Tobit model due to the number of 0 values in the sample. Untabulated results are 
consistent with those reported in Table 7. 
7 For example, Abernethy et al. (2015), Finkelstein (1992), Jensen (1993), Lisic et al. (2016), and van Essen et al. 
(2015). 
8 Finkelstein (1992) identifies structural power, ownership power, expert power and prestige power as the four 
key aspects that enable individuals to manage and influence corporate decisions. Prestige power is not considered 
as part of the power index as data is unavailable in the Australian setting. 
9 The average size of the remuneration committee in the sample is 3.635. The smallest committee size is 1 director, 
whereas the largest committee size is 9 directors. 
10 Shaw and Zhang (2010) provide a simple timeline (Figure 1, p. 1067) of events associated with incentive 
contracts. First, at the end of year t–1 (beginning of year t), CEOs and remuneration committees agree upon ex 
ante contracts to be used in evaluating and rewarding CEO performance in year t. At the end of year t, year t’s 
actual performance is observed and compared to ex ante conditions in order to finalise CEO compensation for 
year t.  
11 This study does not control for firm fixed effects due to the limited sample size. The sample contains 220 
individual firms. The average number of times each firm is present in the sample is 4.93. 
12 Not all firms report the specific breakdown of the performance weights applied in the CEO’s bonus contract. 
Therefore, the subsample to test H2 as well as the performance consequences of non-financial targets (H3a–d), is 
reduced by 398 observations. 
13 Sensitivity tests are performed where data is winsorized at the top and bottom one percent. Untabulated results 
are consistent as reported in the main tables. 
14 Abernethy et al. (2015) provide evidence that CEOs’ influence their equity-based compensation in the U.S. 
setting. 
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15 The result is in contrast to Ittner et al. (1997) who find no association between CEO power and the use of non-
financial performance targets used in cash bonus contracts. A comparison of the measures of CEO power applied 
in this study versus those applied by Ittner et al. (1997) may explain the differing results, as may the use of different 
sample years and settings. Similar reasons may explain contrasting evidence to a recent study by Cho, Ibrahim 
and Yan (2019). 
16  See Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker (2010), Rosenbaum (2001), and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for 
discussion and application of the propensity score matching procedure. 
17 We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue. 
18 Therefore, powerful CEOs ultimately realise more total cash compensation because they are receiving a greater 
proportion of a greater bonus ratio. 
 
 
